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Judea Pearl, a Turing Award prize winner, is a true giant of the field of computer science 
and artificial intelligence. The Turing award is the highest distinction in computer 
science; i.e., the Nobel Prize of computing. To say that his new book with Dana 
Mackenzie is timely is, in our view, an understatement. Coming from somebody of his 
stature and being written for a general audience (unlike his previous books), means that 
the concerns we have held about both the limitations of solely data driven approaches to 
artificial intelligence (AI) and the need for a causal approach, will finally reach a very 
broad audience.  
We have long been sceptical of the dominant idea that when 'big data' is coupled 
with sophisticated machine learning algorithms they can provide ‘real’ intelligence. Many 
mainstream computer scientists and data scientists have propagated this idea without 
meeting resistance, resulting in it being eagerly accepted across government and 
commercial organisations. This has led to a seemingly unstoppable tidal wave of ‘big 
data solutions’ and reports on the ‘dangers and opportunities of AI’ in the mainstream 
press. We are sold the idea that we will get access to useful solutions without having to 
do any kind of considered thinking ourselves, and with little real effort or cost. In many 
respects this data-driven approach to AI was a reaction to the exact opposite approach – 
that relied exclusively on experts - that drove the (failed) ‘first wave’ AI revolution of the 
1980s: in that wave it was mistakenly assumed that AI could be achieved from expert-
provided ‘rules’ coupled with massive computing power in the resulting rule-based 
systems. 
 In Chapter 1, the core message about the need for causal models is underpinned 
by what Pearl calls “The Ladder of Causation”, which is then used to orient the ideas 
presented throughout the book. Pearl’s ladder of causation suggests that there are three 
steps to achieving true AI. The first step concerns what can be learnt solely from 
observational data and Pearl argues that we can only learn statistical associations. For 
example, from data we can answer questions like “what disease best explains the 
observed symptoms?” But to be able to answer questions about interventions (e.g. “If I 
take this drug will it stop the symptoms?”) and counterfactuals (e.g. “If I hadn’t taken 
this drug would my symptoms disappear?”) then we must consider causal models. 
Answering these essentially causal questions moves us beyond mere association and 
hence interventions and counterfactuals form the next two steps in Pearl’s ladder of 
causation. Pearl also characterises these three steps on the ladder as 1) ‘seeing’; 2) 
‘doing’; and 3) ‘imagining’. 
 The chapters that follow up to and including Chapter 6 cover interesting historical 
events, from the birth of statistics to the genesis of causal inference, with many excellent 
examples and eloquent paradoxes, demonstrating the uncertainty and difficulty in 
establishing causal relationships from observational data. According to Pearl, the state 
of the art in AI today is merely a ‘souped-up’ version of what machines could already do 
a generation ago: find hidden regularities in a large set of data. “All the impressive 
achievements of deep learning amount to just curve fitting”, he said recently. 
One of the reasons ‘deep learning’ has been so successful is that many problems 
can be solved by optimisation alone without the need to even consider advancing to 
rungs in the ladder of causation beyond the first. These problems include machine vision 
and machine listening, natural language processing, robot navigation, as well as other 
problems that fall within the areas of clustering, pattern recognition and anomaly 
detection. Big data in these cases is clearly very important and the advances being 
made using deep learning are undoubtedly impressive, but Pearl convincingly argues 
that they are not AI. 
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It is clear that other problems go beyond prediction and demand answers to 
questions about intervention and counterfactuals and hence, require advancement up 
the ladder of causation to rungs two and three respectively. Areas like medicine, 
criminology, marketing, finance and public policy need answers to what are essentially 
causal questions. A ‘smart data’ approach combining data with knowledge-based 
information, representing the underlying causal or temporal aspects of a problem, must 
be adopted to achieve more intelligent solutions for risk assessment and decision-
making. The Bayesian Network framework, that Pearl developed and pioneered some 
40 years ago for causal probabilistic reasoning, offers the capability to build suitable 
smart models that answer these more difficult questions. The book provides a very 
convincing demonstration of the need for causal models (our own work in this area has 
always been heavily influenced by Pearl’s work). 
 Chapter 7 goes into the details of rung two; interventions. This chapter presents 
the do-calculus which in some ways is an alternative to randomized control trials, that 
can often be impractical and expensive, as a valid method for determining causal 
effects. This chapter is certainly not as easy to appreciate as earlier chapters without a 
solid understanding of conditional independence and causal models in general. In brief, 
what the do-calculus enables us to do is to examine the effect of some intervention on 
some other effect factor within a causal model, and we can retrieve the desired effect of 
the intervention by making the intervention itself independent of all its causes. Pearl 
emphasizes that the lack of a calculus for causal modelling and inference is what has 
held up progress for so long. He notes that, even though such a calculus (notably 
Bayesian networks) has been around for a while now, it is still shamefully ignored even 
by many statisticians. 
The third rung of the ladder is presented in Chapter 8. Pearl highlights the 
importance of counterfactual reasoning by arguing that our ability to compare what 
happened with what could have happened under some alternative scenario is the result 
of a causal mind that enables us to comprehend responsibility, blame, regret and credit. 
A system that is able to answer “what if I had not taken the drug”, is a system that 
becomes capable of answering questions of counterfactual reasoning based on 
unobserved evidence.  
An important application of counterfactual reasoning is on estimating missing 
data values, which is a common issue when working with real-world data. This is 
perhaps a widely underestimated problem since it is often erroneously assumed that 
missing values in a dataset can be ‘predicted’, and thus imputed, by examining other 
observed values in that dataset. Many such statistical imputations methods exist. Pearl 
argues that these methods are fundamentally flawed due to being ‘model-blind’; “no 
methods based only of data (rung one) can answer counterfactual questions (rung 
three)”. 
Among the potential applications of counterfactual reasoning, Pearl includes the 
examples of law and climate change. In law he notes that counterfactual reasoning 
corresponds to the very old and well-known notion of ‘but-for causation’ for which the 
Model Penal Code provides a test; for example, if  Joe blocks a building’s fire exit, and 
Judy dies in a fire after she could not reach the exit, then Joe is legally responsible for 
her death even though he did not start the fire. This is because ‘but-for’ his actions Judy 
would not have died in the fire. Pearl uses this example to introduce probabilities into the 
argument and he notes (somewhat ironically) that, despite the central role of such 
probabilistic reasoning in law, the profession has been too conservative and slow to 
accept mathematical methods.  The climate change application is less convincing 
despite the fact, as Pearl points out, that it is possible to get large amounts of 
counterfactual data from the simulated outcomes of climate change models. Although, 
he is critical of simulation models used in natural and social sciences - and recognises 
the wider problem of placing trust in computer simulations - Pearl suggests that ‘by any 
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normal scientific standards the climate models are strong and compelling evidence’. In 
our view this is not completely consistent with the message of the rest of the book. 
The final chapter of the book closes with some general thoughts on AI and Big 
Data. Scientific research, as well as day-to-day questions, are driven by cause-and-
effect. Does smoking cause lung cancer or is there a gene that determines 
predisposition to cancer? Does gender cause the wage gap? Will this drug cure my 
disease or treat my symptoms? Would my company’s profit be higher had we followed a 
different marketing strategy? What is the expected impact of this new policy? Did the 
judge make the correct decision given the evidence? All these questions are causal. Yet, 
most will try to answer such questions using methods restricted to identifying 
associations. While the difference between association and causation is nowadays well 
understood, what has changed over the last few decades is mainly the way the results 
are stated rather than the way they are generated. While deep learning has been proven 
to work well for tasks requiring no causal understanding, our understanding of deep 
learning is almost completely empirical, and we often cannot explain why it works. Some 
will argue that transparency is not really needed in those cases, and they may be 
correct. However, transparency does enable effective communication; not just between 
humans and machines – but also between machines themselves. Regardless, Pearl 
convincingly argues through his book that causal questions cannot be answered from 
data alone without a causal model. 
If we have one small gripe about the book it is that the language used sometimes 
equates the results of the causal models reported with mathematical proof. For example, 
geneticists might consider a genetic confounder to be inconceivable as a causal 
mechanism for smoking, but something being difficult to conceive is not mathematically 
equivalent to impossible. 
 There is much excellent material in this book but, for us, the two key messages 
are: 1) “True AI” cannot be achieved by data and curve fitting alone, since causal 
representation of the underlying problems is also required to answer “what-if” questions, 
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